^M^ 


s^.:\t^ 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-S) 


// 


1.0 


11.25 


(^  1^    112.2 


I.I     I  "^  11^ 


1.8 


U    1 1.6 


V 


^ 


•>  ^^v 


Photographic 

Sciences 

Corporation 


•^ 


\ 


<J 


,v 


<^ 


^   -*  \  "^ 


o^ 


23  WEST  MAIN  STREET 

WEBSTER,  N.V.  14580 

(716)  872-4S03 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
original  copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this 
copy  which  may  be  bibliographically  unique, 
which  may  alter  any  of  the  images  in  the 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
the  usual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


r~7f  Coloured  covers/ 
bjii    Couverture  de  couleur 


I     I    Covers  damaged/ 


D 


Couverture  endommagie 


Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaur^  et/ou  pellicul^e 


I      I    Cover  title  missing/ 


Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 


I      I    Coloured  maps/ 


D 


Cartes  gdographiques  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleuft  ou  noire) 


I      I    Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 


D 
D 


D 


D 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material/ 
Reiii  avec  d'autres  documents 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  re  liure  serr6e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  intirieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certaines  pages  blanches  ajout6es 
lors  d'une  restauration  apparaissent  dans  le  texte, 
mais,  lorsque  cela  ttait  possible,  ces  pages  n'ont 
pas  6ti  film6es. 

Additional  comments:/ 
Commentaires  suppldmentaires: 


L'Institut  a  microfilmi  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  M  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details 
de  cet  exemplaire  qui  sont  peut-Atre  uniques  du 
point  de  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dans  la  mithode  normale  de  filmage 
sont  indiqute  ci-dessous. 


|~~|   Coloured  pages/ 


The 
tot 


Pages  de  couleur 

Pages  damaged/ 
Pager*  endommag^es 


□    Pages  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Pages  restaurdes  et/ou  pelliculAes 

FyP  Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
I      '    Pages  d^colories,  tachet^es  ou  piqudes 

□    Pages  detached/ 
Pages  ditachdes 

r~T/Showthrough/ 
L^   Transparence 

□   Quality  of  print  varies/ 
Qualiti  inigale  de  I'impression 

□    Includes  supplementary  material/ 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppl^mentaire 

□    Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Mition  disponible 


The 
pos 
oft 

fillT 


Ori| 
beg 
the 
sioi 
oth 
firs 
sloi 
ori 


Th« 
sha 
TIN 
wh 

Ma 
dm 
ent 
bef 
rigl 
req 
me 


D 


Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata 
slips,  tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
ensure  the  best  possible  image/ 
Les  pages  totalement  ou  partiellement 
obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata.  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  M  filmtes  d  nouveau  de  fapoii  A 
obtenir  la  meilieure  image  possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  est  film6  au  taux  de  rMuction  indiquA  ci-dessous. 

10X  14X  18X  22X 


26X 


XX 


12X 


16X 


y 

20X 


MX 


28X 


32X 


I 

tails 
I  du 
odifier 
une 
mage 


The  copy  filmed  here  has  been  reproduced  thanks 
to  the  generosity  of: 

IMetropoiltan  Toronto  Library 
Social  Sciences  Department 


The  images  appearing  here  are  the  best  quality 
possible  considering  the  cond'tion  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
filming  contract  specifications. 


L'exemplaire  film6  fut  reproduit  grflce  A  la 
gAn6rosit4  de: 

Metropolitan  Toronto  Library 

Social  Sciences  Department 


Les  images  suivantes  ont  6t6  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin,  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
de  la  nettetA  de  l'exemplaire  f  ilm6,  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  and  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  ^^  (meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

IMaps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  exempiaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  imprimte  sont  fiimte  en  commenpant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
dernidre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exempiaires 
originaux  sont  fiimte  en  commenpant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  derniire  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboies  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
derniAre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  seion  le 
cas:  le  symbols  -^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE",  le 
symbols  V  signifie  "FIN  ". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
fiimis  d  des  taux  de  rMuction  diff6rents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clich6,  il  est  fiimd  A  partir 
de  I'angle  sup6rieur  gauche,  de  gauche  d  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  ndcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  m6thode. 


rrata 
;o 


;)elure, 
Id 


□ 


32X 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

"H 


ntx  f"^  K  ».3 


s^ 


m 


TORONTO  PUBUC  LIBRARIES 


REFERENCE  LIBRARY 


\ 


j^"* 


WM 


t'. 


FINITE   PERSONALITY* 
Rev.  Marshall  P.  Tallinq,  Ph.  D.,  Toronto,  Ontario. 


A  GraduatioK  Thesis ;  Coarse  A.  Pbilosopby. 

PERSONALITY  THE    KEY  TO   THE    NATURE    OF  REALITY. 

First,  highest,  and  only  home-certainty,  I  find  myself  in 
an  environment  which  I  fain  would  understand.  To  be  an 
explanation  for  me,  it  must  be  made  in  terms  I  can  compre- 
hend. This  farther  necessity  is  also  laid  upon  me:  I  must 
start  Just  where  I  am  because  I  cannot  get  outside  of  myself 
and  of  the  world,  to  look  at  both  as  an  observer.  If  I  could 
do  so,  instead  of  deriving  an  advantage,  I  should  be  farther 
away  from  both  sell  and  the  world  than  at  present,  for  /  as 
part  of  the  world,  and  inter-related  therewith,  find  in  myself 
a  clue  to  the  nature  of  all  that  is.  The  point  at  which  I 
touch  reality  is  just  where  I  am.  /  am  real.  Consciousness 
of  self  is  consciousness  of  reality.  The  assurance  of  a  reality 
wider  than  self,  is  found  in  the  fact  of  self-reality.  Know- 
ledge of  matter,  like  knowledge  of  other  selves,  is  based  on 
the  conscious  permanence  of  self. 

Consciousness  must  be  trusted  in  its  first  step  (self-con- 
sciousness), if  all  subsequent  steps  are  not  to  be  distrusted. 
It  may  be  a  picturesque  way  of  putting  it,  but  none  the  less  is 
it  true  that  "the  self  and  the  world  are  only  two  sides  of  the 
same  reality."^  "To  say  that  man  can,  so  to  speak, 
contemplate  existence  from  the  point  of  view  of  cmniscence 
seems  to  be  the  extreme  of  presumption.  It  must  be  observed, 
however,  that  it  is  no  less  presumptuous  to  say  that  man 
cannot  know  things  as  they  really  are.  For  how  can  any  one 
say  that  we  do  not  know  real  existence  unless  he  has  some 
knowledge  of  what  real  existence  is?  Presumptuous  or  not, 
philosophy  cannot  avoid  the  question :  Is  the  knowledge  of  real 


*This  is  a  section  of  a  lariter  work  on  "The  Philosophy  of  Prayer." 
'S«th,  Hegelianism  and  Personality,  p.  20. 


8 


Finite  Personality. 


existence  possible?  Tlias  the  enquiry  into  the  nature  of 
knowledge  is  necessarily  bound  up  with  the  inquiry  into  the 
nature  of  existence."^  I  should  say  if,  on  the  one  hand,  God 
and  man  are  one  in  nature,  and  on  the  other,  man  and  nature 
are  not  foreign  to  each  other,  then  we  do  not  require  "the  point 
of  view  of  omniscience"  to  know  reality.  To  know  at  all  is  to 
knew  reality.  Anything  less  than  this  would  make  the  term 
a  misnomer.  If  there  be  knowledge,  and  in  this  all  are  agreed, 
then  irresistible  logic  drives  to  the  unavoidable  conclusion 
that  we  know  reality.  Obviously  the  view-point  of  omniscience 
is  denied  us,  but  a  knowledge  of  real  existence  may  be  given  us 
before  perfect  knowledge  is  granted.  Development  demands 
the  real  to  start  with,  as  certainly  as  it  demands  increasing 
clearness  of  definition.  One  depends  on  the  other.  Ours  is 
the  view-point  of  limited  knowledge,  yet  our  knowledge  is  not 
confined  to  the  unreal;  that  would  not  hold  together,— 
anchorage  is  included.  Nay,  more;  we  may  go  farther  and 
confidently  assert  that  we  grip  the  real  in  self- consciousness. 
Not  in  any  indirectly  cognized,  external  material,  certainly; 
that  field  is  too  distant.  It  is  found  at  home  in  immediate 
self-knowledge. 

No  other  postulate  will  account  for  the  fact  of  knowledge, 
or  the  prior  fact  that  a  person  is  on  hand  looking  for  an  ex- 
planation of  himself  and  the  world  around  him.  No  other 
postulate  keeps  time  with  the  movements  of  self-consciousness. 
Indeed  we  must  quit  using  the  term  "knowledge*'  altogether 
or  yield  to  the  coercion  which  forces  us  to  recognition  of  the 
ultimate  reality  in  personality. 

Stupendous  are  the  implications !  God  and  matter  inter- 
preted in  terms  of  man's  nature!  But  anthropomorphism 
loses  its  oflfensiveness  if  it  be  theomorphic;  then,  too,  matter 
crosses  the  gulf.  If  this  can  be  substantiated,  we  have  a 
universe  with  no  absolutely  alien  parts,  i.  e.,  a  true  universe; 
and  man  in  his  self-consciousness  finds  the  key  to  its  nature. 
This  may  not  be  called  "presumptuous"  either,  except  by  one 
who  can  prove  that  the  whole  of  what  is,  is  not  a  universe. 

If  man's  nature  is  theomorphic,  the  anthropomorphism  of 
his  knowledge  becomes  at  the  point  of  self-consciousness  an 


w 

wi 


'Prof.  Watson.  Kant  and  his  English  Critics,  pp.  11, 12. 


Finite  Personality. 


3 


ontology.  Knowledge  is  the  meeting  point  of  the  material  and 
non-material;  of  (so-called)  matter,  and  spirit;  which,  becaase 
they  do  meett  are  not  alien.  The  unity  of  nature  receives  in 
the  fact  of  knowledge  its  fit  and  final  demonstration.  At  the 
heart  of  reality  stands  personality,  i.  e.,  self-realized  reality, 
the  only  first-hand  reality  we  are  acquainted  with;  all  else, 
however  certain,  however  closely  related,  being  inferential. 
The  whole  that  it  must  be  of  a  piece,  or  knowledge  would  not 
be  possible;  also  the  whole  that  is  must  possess  a  oneness  of 
nature  to  be  an  universe. 

To  speak  of  an  "universe*'  that  throws  self-consciousness 
over  the  fence  is  an  impossible  endeavor  to  describe  what 
could  not  be  known.  Per  contra,  take  this :  an  universe  con- 
stituted of  a  single  system  of  relations  has  in  it,  nevertheless, 
the  thinker  whose  thought  knits  these  relations,  and  he  is  not 
himself  a  relation  nor  a  system  of  relations.  He  is  real  and 
he  is  spirit.  Then  "reality"  is  spiritual?  For  a  starting  point 
this  seems  eminently  satisfactory. 

That  the  primal  reality  is  not  material  is  certainly 
demonstrated  by  Green,  and  by  many  kindred  writers. 
Does  it,  then,  necessarily  follow  that  the  external  world  is 
ditferent  in  nature  from  spirit,  and  yet  owes  its  reality  to  re- 
lations thought  by  spirit?  Without  attempting  a  reply,  let 
me  acknowledge  the  startling  difference  between  the  orderly 
sequences  of  nature's  phenomena,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
self-  determined  freedom  of  man,  on  the  other,  to  say  nothing 
of  self  consciousness.  Does  not  the  contrast  sufficiently 
establish  different  orders  of  being?  This  much  may  be  freely 
admitted,  that  if  an  affirmative  answer  would  not  land  us  in 
manifest  difficulty  we  should  be  tempted  to  assent ;  but,  not 
seeing  a  means  of  egress  in  that  direction,  it  may  be  excusable 
to  examine  the  ground  indicated,  if  haply,  it  should  provide  a 
way  out  of  involved  perplexity;  for  it  is  still  left  to  determine 
whether  the  ''higher  principles  within  man"  and  the  lower 
without  him  may  be  leveled  up  to  the  same  order.  It  will  not 
do  to  assume  they  cannot.  Moreover,  spirit,  the  stuff'  consti^ 
tuting  the  thinker,  may  make  as  substantial  a  world  as  the 
relations  efl'ected  by  his  thinking. 

Monism,  as  a  theory,  owes  its  existence  to  meet  precisely 
the  difficulty  here  confronting  us;  but  begining,  like  material- 


Finite  Personality. 


ism,  with  RD  objective  postulate,  it  misrepresents  human  per- 
sonality, and  un-personizes  the  Divine.  Man  is  warped  to  fit 
the  logical  exigencies  of  the  theory,  and  God  becomes  a  world- 
eject  represented  by  an  algebraic  **X.'*^ 

Professor  Royce  of  Harvard  thus  refers  to  the  difficulty 
of  apprehending  the  real :  "My  own  thesis  is  that  the  mere  re- 
moval of  this  limitation  (i.  e.,  the  'limitation  of  span'  that 
characterizes  the  human  type  of  consciousness)  would  in  and 
of  itself  inyolve  the  lifting  of  the  veil  that  is  proverbially  said 
to  hide  reality.  For  reality  according  to  my  idealism  is  8im> 
ply  the  whole  of  what  one  actually  means  from  the  finite  point 
of  view."'  However  enigmatic  the  closing  phrase  of  the  extract 
may  be,  its  earlier  declaration  may  undoubtedly  be  conceded. 
Nevertheless,  acknowledged  "limitation"  does  not  confine 
consciousness  to  knowledge  of  the  unreal.  If  that  were  the 
only  thing  capable  of  being  known,  there  could  be  no  know- 
ledge at  all.  The  real  is  necessary  to  know  the  real.  Indeed, 
the  real  is  necessary  even  to  conceive  the  unreal.  Herein,  too, 
is  seen  the  logical  precedence  of  personality.  The  fact  that 
we  distinguish  between  substance  and  shadow;  between  real 
and  phenomenal;  between  constant  and  variable  relations,  is 
evidence    that    knowledge  is  not  confined  to  the  phenomenal. 

To  put  the  whole  problem  in  a  nutshell :  The  real  is  neces- 
sary to  the  orderly,  the  orderly  to  knowledge.  That  the  not- 
me  is  known  indirectly  is  conceded.  That  self  is  known  im- 
mediately is  not  denied.  In  order  to  knowledge,  therefore, 
reality  must  be  found  in  self  and  all  other  reality  interpreted 
from  the  nature  of  the  ego. 

The  subject  occupying  our  attention  is  dealt  with  by 
Lotze,  something  after  this  fashion.'  The  common  notion  o* 
things  allows  us  to  give  renlness  only  to  that  which  is  of  the 
nature  of  mind,  because  (as  has  been  shown)  the  being  of 
things  is  not  sensible  qualities,  nor  is  it  supersensible  intel- 
lectual qualities,  nor  unknown  qualities,  nor  an  unknown  sub 
strate,  nor  lastly,  merely  a  significant  thought.  If  it  be  con- 
ceived  as  an  operative  idea,  that  will  scarcely  answer  either, 


^Vide,  6.  J.  Romanes,  Mind,  Motion  and  Monism,  p.  88,  seq. 
'Studies  of  Good  and  Evil,  p.  XI  of  Introduction. 
Wide,  MicrocosmoB,  Book  IX,  Chap.  III. 


Finite  Personnlity,  5 

because  it  is  we  who  give  this  reality  to  the  idea.  "The  only 
kind  of  reality  that  coald  possibly  belong  to  it  is  that  of  being 
a  thought,  really  thought  by  some  thinker." 

After    indicating    that    Idealism    (e.  g.,  Kantian,)  re- 
servos  to  spiritual  beings  a  realness  which  it  refuses  to  selfless 
things,  he  continues :   "Now  what  hinders  us  from  finding  in 
this  mental  nature  that  addition  which  the  previously  empty 
notion   of    things  needed  in  order  to  become  the  complete  no- 
tion of  somewhat  real?"    "Why  should  we  not  transform  the 
assertion  that  only  minds  are  real  into  the  assertion  that  all 
that  is  real  is  mind?"    This,  it  may  be  objected,  would  destroy 
the    "externality",    evidently    characteristic  of  things.    No. 
Existence    for    self   is    the  "externality"  or  realness  wanted. 
UealuesB    is  the  being  of  that  which  exists  for  self.    But  as 
there  are  degrees  of  consciousness  so  there  are  degrees  of  real- 
ness   in  things.    "Hence    to  realness  in  this  sense  we  can  at- 
tribute different  degrees  of  intensity;  we  cannot  say  of  every- 
thing    that    it  is    altogether  real,  or  altogether  not  real ;  bnt 
beings  detaching  themselves  from  the  Infinite,  with  varying 
wealth  and   unequal  complexity  of  self-existence,  are  real  in 
different  degrees,  while  all  continue  to  be  immanent  in  the  Infi- 
nite."*    Proposition  VII.    "The  demand  made  by  the  notion 
of  things  and  their  formal  determinations  can  be  fulfilled  only 
by  that  which  is  of  the  nature  of  mind."    Proposition  VIII. 
"Hence  either  only  minds  exist,  or  things  are  beings  which 
share  with  minds  in  various  degrees  the  general  characteristic 
of  mentality,  namely,  self- existence."    Proposition  IX.    "The 
realness  of  things  and  their  self- existence  are  notions  which 
have  precisely  the  same  significance."    A  mind  which  continues 
immanent  in  the  Infinite,  directly  that  it  exists  for  self,  has  in 
this  very  self-existence  the  fullest  realness. 

How,  then,  account  for  the  weight  and  impenetrability  of 
matter,  cause  and  effect,  etc.?  The  author  neglects  neither 
this  nor  kindred  problems,  but  these  are  aside  from  the  imme- 
diate object  we  are  pursuing.  Our  reason  foi;  quoting  so  fally 
is  that  the  reader  may  catch  the  Lotzean  notion  that  self- 
isolation,  the  highest  characteristic  of  personalityi  constitutes 
the  highest  reatness. 


»P.  646. 


0  Finite  Personality. 

By  nay  of  recapitulation,  therefore :  empiricism  redaoea 
all  reality  t**  "an  unknown"  and  "the  Unknowable,"  becauae  it 
accepts  mat '  or  as  the  fundamental  real.  The  idealistic  theory, 
having  estal'lished  the  existence  of  a  non-natural  principle, 
spiritual,  permanent  and  synthetic  in  ita  action,  is  content  to 
assert  that  "constant  relations"  is  the  final  definition  of  objec- 
tive reality.  Our  thesis  is  that  all  reality  is  oltiroately 
spiritual  and  that  its  nature  is  apprehended  in  self-conscious  • 
ness.  Personality  stands  "within  the  veil"  and  in  self-realiza- 
tion finds  tho  clue  at  once  to  subjective  and  objective  reality. 
The  transcendental  is  at  home  with  itself  in  self  consciousness. 
The  ego  is  the  key  to  its  own  mystery,  and  as  far  as  we  can 
trace  it,  to  the  mystery  of  matter. 

Kant's  dictum,  "the  understanding  makes  nature,"  presents 
one  side  of  the  truth  because  the  categories  are  native,  not 
foreign;  consequently  a  knowledge  of  nature  depends  on  the 
intelligence  of  man.  But  "the  understanding"  cannot  sot  to 
work  arbitrarily  in  "making  nature."  If  it  does  so,  it  produces 
only  phantasmagoria.  The  "constancy  of  relations"  depends 
not  wholly  upon  thinking.  Thought  has  to  conform  itself  to 
its  content.  Relations  are  apprehended  as  frequently  as  they 
are  "made."  Mind  could  not  do  the  one  nor  the  other,  unless 
in  the  first  case  it  were  determined  ex  mente :  in  the  other, 
possessed  native  powers. 

The  "form"  and  the  "matter"  of  knowledge  indicates  its 
double  source,  but  the  sensuous  element  in  cognition  has  un> 
known  birth  only  when  we  are  unacquainted  with  its  parentage. 
If  we  could  stand  within  reality  (as  I  claim  we  do,)  discover 
its  nature  to  be  akin  to  our  own  (as  I  believe  it  is)  then  there 
wonld  be  no  room  for  Spencer  to  talk  of  "the  unknown"  or 
Kant  to  speak  darkly  of  the  "thing-in-itself." 

Materialism  owes  its  distress  to  ita  inability  to  discover 
the  nature  of  the  veiled  *'substrate"  on  the  other  side  of  phe^ 
nomena.  "It  cannot  be  known /rom  the  outside\  ergo,  it  is 
placed  forever  beyond  human  ken." 

No,  we  reply,  it  can  be  known  from  the  inside  by  a  resi- 
dent conscious  reality  who  stands  behind  the  veil  and  within 
reality.  The  gap,  gulf,  abyss,  owes  its  unphilosophical  intui- 
tion to  an  improper  method  of  approaching  the  subject. 
Locke,  the  unwitting  father  of  modern  agnosticism,  asiumed 


Finite  Per$onaUty, 


the  BubstratQ  aB  real.  la  some  inexplicable  manner  it  worked 
the  miracle  of  crossing  the  "guK"  and  writing  itself  into  the 
bare  tablet  of  the  mind,  a  ready-made  produce  thrust  upon  us. 
It  was  not  seen  then  that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  without 
synthetic  function  of  an  active  power,  the  primal  and  only  im- 
mediately known  reality. 

Even  Kant,  who  led  pbilosophy  past  the  mistake  of  em- 
piricism and  proved  the  existence  of  a  spiritual  principle — the 
transcendental  ego, — still  talked  of  **ding  an  «toA,"  impugned 
the  validity  of  the  *'Ideas  of  Reason,"  and  constituted  objec- 
tive reality  of  ideal  relations.  However  fervently  the  empiri- 
cal camp  may  chorus  "Amen"  to  Kant's  averment  that  God 
and  the  ego  transcend  knowledge,  they  cannot  see  in  *'ideal 
relations"  the  tangible  material  they  weigh  and  analyze  and 
trace  through  various  transformations  from  invisible  gas  to 
incompressible  liquid  or  impenetrable  solid;  nor  in  them  find 
an  habitation  for  ''natural  forces." 

Our  contention  is  that  permanent  subject  and  permanent 
object  are  akin  in  nature.  Knowing  my  own  nature,  the  ob- 
jective is  not  "unknowable,"  is  in  fact  but  2e««  knowahle  than 
my  alter  ego.  I  know  his  nature  and  interpret  his  character 
from  «e(/'-knowledge.  Likewise  I  interpret  the  objective  world 
— animal,  vegetable,  mineral— by  codes  adapted  to  their  vary- 
ing orders  of  being,  but  showing  the  fundamental  underlying 
reality  to  bo  one  in  nature,  though  descending  in  hierarchical 
order  from  self-conscious  personality  to  unconcsious  atom. 
When  human  personality  is  understood,  it  is  seen  to  be  neither 
wholly  mechanical,  on  the  one  hand,  nor  wholly  lost  in  Diety, 
on  the  other ;  but,  akin  to  its  environment,  spiritual  and  nat- 
ural,  it  ranks  between  the  ''Higher"  and  the  lower  "than  I," 
possessing  no  small  range  of  "self-differentiation"  from  the 
universe  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  A  limited  personality  truly, 
yet  sharing  the  intelligence  and  will  of  the  Highest — ^yielded 
in  part  to  His  children — and  capable  of  fuller  development. 
Also  man  partakes  in  part  of  the  nature  of  that  which  is  with- 
out him  and  lower  than  he,  though  kindred  to  him. 

PERSONALITY  SACRIFICED  BY  MODERN  PSYCHOLOGY. 

It  will  aid  us  in  our  consideration  of  volition,  emotion 
and  self-isolation — further  characteristics  of  the  ego— if  at 


8 


Finite  PersonaHty, 


this  juncture  we  change  our  point  of  view  and  look  at  "facts" 
from  the  standpoint  of  physiological  psychology. 

In  a  general  sense  the  radical  distinction  between  these 
opposed  schools  of  psychological  research,  namely,  that  of 
spiritualism,  rationalism  or  idealism,  or  ',he  one  hand,  and  of 
positivism,  monism,  physicism,  etc.,  on  the  other,  may  be 
expressed  in  the  terms,  "subjective"  and  ''objective."  More 
plainly,  the  contrast  between  them  divides  into  a  movement 
of  three  moments  on  each  side — postulate,  method  and  result. 

Empirical  psychology  grounds  on  materialism  and  cul- 
minates in  agnosticism :  its  postulate — matter,  plus  inherent 
qualities;  its  method — observation  and  experiment;  its  lind- 
ing — phenomena  and  their  relations ;  beyond  that  conjecture. 

The  old  psychology  begins  in  the  realm  of  consciousness, 
assuming  self  as  a  spiritual  principle;  its  method,  self- 
introspection,  JustiGed  or  modified  by  observation;  its  result, 
verification  of  "personality"  as  a  spiritual  and  permanent 
entity,  culminating  in  God,  the  Supreme  Spirit,  in  whom  all 
things  have  their  being. 

"Because  of  its  unique  character,  self-consciousness  must 
be  exploited  by  a  method  of  its  own,"  say  the  Old  School. 
Impossible !  replies  the  New,  for  that  is  to  postulate  a  "mythi- 
cal" something  which  science  cannot  consider,  the  ego,  "a 
fiction  born  of  nonentity."  And  so  it  comes  to  pass  that,  dis- 
trusting introspection,  the  physiological  psychologist  studies 
mind  ab  extras  begins  far  afield  and  works  towards  conscious- 
ness. Having  accustomed  himself  to  forces  and  their  measure- 
ments, he  pursues  psychometry  to  the  borderland  of  conscious- 
ness and  rises  from  "kinesis"  to  "metakincsis."  In  man  is 
found  a  certain  yery  complex  organism,  a  nervous  system,  the 
concomitants  of  whose  processes  are  thoughts,  feelings,  etc. 
The  origin  and  development  of  this  organism  can  be  traced 
from  the  beginning  of  life  up  to  man,  and  some  philosophers 
and  scientists,  such  as  Haeckel  and  Spencer,  trace  it  to  ultimate 
chemical  atoms. 

Here  we  are  on  ground  occupied  by  two  theories  in  their 
method  of  finding  a  substitute  for  mind  as  a  spiritual  entity, 
diflTeriug  only  as  to  the  date  at  which  consciousness  appears 
on  the  scene.  The  "mind-dust"  theory  posits  atomistic  con- 
sciousness in    the  orifl;inal  fire-mist  of  the  nebula.    "The  self- 


Finite  Personality. 


.»» 


same  atoms  which,  chaotically  dispersed,  made  the  nebula, 
now,  jammed  and  temporarily  caught  in  peculiar  positions, 
form  our  brains;  and  the  evolution  of  the  brains,  if  under- 
stood, would  be  simply  the  account  of  how  the  atoms  came  to 
be  so  caught  and  jammed."^  Mental  states  are  compounds  of 
mind-stuff.  Each  atom  of  the  original  nebula,  it  is  supposed, 
must  have  had  an  aboriginal  atom  of  consciousness  linked 
with  it.  Aggregates  of  material  atoms  make  these  bodies 
forms;  so  by  an  analogous  process  of  aggregation  mental 
atoms  have  fused  into  "consciousness*'  such  as  we  know  in 
ourselves  and  suppose  to  exist  in  our  fellow  animals.  *'Some 
such  doctrine  of  atomistic  nylozoism  as  this  is  an  indispensable 
part  of  the  thorough  going  philosophy  of  evolution."' 

The  "automatic  theory'*  makes  consciousness  the  product 
of  the  brain  and  identifies  it  with  motion.  When  the  dance 
of  the  molecules  reaches  a  certain  intensity  and  complexity, 
•'matter  becomes  self-conscious."  Self-consciousness  is  not 
therefore  the  consciousness  of  a  ''self*  or  ego.  Whatever  mind 
accompanies  the  movement  is  there  merely  as  an  "epiphe- 
nomenon,"  an  inert  observer,  a  sort  of  "foam,  aura  or  melody," 
as  Mr.  Hodgson  puts  it,  whose  opposition  or  furtherance  is 
alike  powerless.  Mind  is  the  help*3ss  result  of  dancing  mole- 
cules.  In  so  many  words  Professor  Huxley  tells  us  "we  are 
conscious  automata"  and  La  Mettrie  entitles  one  of  his  books 
"The  Man  Machine."  V 

Since,  however,  Wundt  is  the  recogpized  coryphaeus  of  the 
whole  school,  why  not  hear  him?  Havi^^  asked  the  question, 
"What  is  now  the  nature  of  the  mind?  he  answers:'  "Our  mind 
is  nothino;  else  than  the  sum  of  our  inner  experiences,  than  our 
ideation,  feeling  and  willing,  collected  together  to  a  unity  in 
consciousness  and  rising  in  a  series  of  developmental  stages 
to  culminate  in  self-conscious  thought  and  a  will  that  is  mor- 
ally free." 

Not  unlike  this  is  Mr.  Spencer's  theory.  Epitomizing 
from  his  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  he  says  briefly  :*  "Mind 
consists  of  feelings,   and  the  relations  among  feelings.    By 


*JameB«  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  140, 
*Idem.  p.  149. 

'Human  and  Animal  Psycholoey,  p.  451, 
*Data  of  Ethics,  p.  110. 


10 


I     ',: 
|i  i 


Finite  Personality. 


.  I 


ii'l 
fi 

I 


composition  of  the  relations,  and  ideas  of  relations,  intelli* 
gence  arises.  By  composition  of  the  feelings,  and  ideas  of  the 
feelings,  emotion  arises." 

But  enough.  Any  nutshell  statement  of  a  theory  or  fam- 
ily of  theories  must  ever  be  unsatisfactory ;  not  less  so,  how- 
ever, must  be  a  skeleton  retort.  Of  the  swarm  of  questions 
unavoidably  raised,  such,  for  example,  as  to  the  origin  and  ter- 
mination of  the  processes  referred  to,  and  of  the  laws,  chanced 
or  purposive,  by  which  they  are  governed,  we  can  say  nothing 
directly.  One  problem  alone  must  detain  us.  What  bearing 
has  the  above  on  personality?  It  will  be  observed,  that,  bow- 
ever  the  theories  disagree  among  themselves,  they  all  make 
personality  a  product  of  non-personal  forces.  Even  when  the 
ego  is  not  denied  an  existence,  it  is  made  the  name,  not  of  a 
spiritual  entity,  but  of  the  convergent  streams  of  sensations 
which  are  known  by  themselves.  But  if  consciousness  be 
metakinesis ;  if  mind  be  "the  sum  of  our  inner  experiences" 
(Wundt),  or  "consists  of  feelings  and  the  relations  among  feel- 
ings" (Spencer),  then  we  have  feelings,  and  even  feelings  re- 
lated, before  we  get  mind,  since  mind  is  "the  sum." 

Impossible!  because  in  the  cognition  of  the  simplest  sen- 
sation, mind  is  already  actively  at  work. 

When  Condillac  says,  the  first  time  a  child  sees  a  color  it 
is  it,  rath^tTnows  it,  he  touches  a  truth.  It  is  not  *'known" 
until  distinguished  from  what  is  not.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
is  undoubtedly  correct,  therefore,  in  asserting  "plurality,  differ- 
ence, and  change"  as  necessary  to  cognition.  That  is,  plural 
sensations  are  regarded  in  relation  to  one  another.  Until  these 
relations  are  definite  there  is  not  ''knowledge,"  but  only  an  eflfort 
to  understand.  In  short,'  sensations  alone  are  not  knowledge, 
for  the  cognition  of  the  simplest  sensation,  it  must  be  "distin- 
guished from  what  it  is  not."  Now  the  apprehension  of  relation 
is  the  work  of  intelligence.  A  sensation  cannot  know  itself. 
One  sensation  cannot  know  another  sensation.  In  the  apprehen  ■ 
sion  of  an  orange,  color,  flayor,  odor,  etc.,  make  the  percept;  but 
the  odor  does  not  know  the  flavor;  the  color  does  not  cognize 
the  weight.  There  is  a  principle  within,  call  it  what  you  will, 
which  knows  all,  distinguiiihes  and  relates  them,  and  which 
therefore  is  not  itself  a  phenomenon  nor  an  aggregation  of  phe< 
nomena,  bat  a  oognitive  and  abiding  principle  using  the  con- 


Finite  Personality. 


11 


tribution  of  the  senses  for  its  own  purposes.  Thus  a  scent  of 
fire  is  but  a  sensation.  It  is  not  however  another  sensation  or 
cluster  of  sensations  that,  apprehensive  of  consequence^, 
hastens  to  ring  the  fire  alarm. 

"Our  mind  is  nothing  else  than  the  sum  of  our  inner  eX' 
perience"  (Wundt).  We  reply,  it  requires  the  mind  to  make 
the  sum.  Separate  experiences  cannot  live  together  and  trans- 
form themselves  into  a  something  different  from  themselves 
which  is  afterwards  to  turn  around  and  know  them.  "A  per- 
sonality cannot  be  compounded  out  of  a  number  of  *^ersonaU' 
ties."  When  professor  Wundt  tells  us,  *'Oar  mental  experi- 
ences are  as  they  are  presented  to  us,"^  it  is  clear  "personality" 
is  assumed  as  different  from  and  underlying  the  experiences. 
'*Oar"  and  ''to  us'*  betray  the  subject  of  the  experience  which 
self  consciousness  testifies  to  be  other  than  its  experience  and 
permanent  amidst  it  fiux. 

The  same  assumption  carried  Mr.  Spencer  throughout  a 
similar  description.  After  explaining  that  the  Unknowable  is 
manifested  in  a  double  series,  viz.,  of  *'faint  manifestations" 
(subjective),  and  "vivid  manifestations''  (objective,)  he  con- 
tinues, which  *'we  recognize  by  grouping  uhcm  into  self  and 
not-self  \^*  i.  e.,  I  am  on  hand  "grouping"  the  manifestations 
of  which  self  is  compounded. 

As  touching  the  matter  in  hand.  Professor  James  delivers 
himself  thus :  "I  confess  therefore  that  to  posit  a  soul  in- 
fluenced in  some  mysterious  way  by  the  brain-states  and  re* 
spending  to  them  by  conscious  affection,  of  its  own,  seems  to  me 
the  line  of  least  logical  resistance,  so  far  as  we  have  yet  at- 
tained."' Well  and  sanely  said ;  yet  on  the  very  next  page 
our  brilliant  author  confounds  his  convicti  ns  thus :  "The 
bare  Phenomenon^  however ,  the  immediately  known  thing  which 
on  the  mental  side  is  in  apposition  with  the  entire  brain-process, 
is  the  state  of  consciousness  and  not  the  soul  itself." 

He  continues;  The  soul  "explains"  nothing;  accordingly, 
the  "state  of  consciousnesss"  usurps  its  place ;  a  visible  substi- 
tute is  preferred  to  an  "unsafe  hypothesis,"  because  "our  psy- 
chology will  lymain   posltivistic  and  non-metaphysical ;  and 


'Human  and  Animal  Psychology,  p.  452. 
^Principles  of  Pyschology,  Vol.  I,  p.  181. 


J$ 


Finite  Personality. 


although  this  is  certainly  only  a  provitional  halting  place,  and 
thiogi  must  some  day  be  more  thoroughly  thought  out,  we  shall 
abide  there  in  this  book,  and  just  as  we  have  rejected  mind- 
dust  we  shall  take  no  account  of  the  soul."  Faith  plighted  on 
one  page;  allegiance  broken  on  the  next.  A  proceeding  all 
the  more  inconsistent,  since  the  remainder  of  the  work  is  full 
of  metaphysio.  Nevertheless  the  only  key  to  a  rational  ex- 
plication of  man,  nature  and  God,  is  laid  on  the  shelf  until  he 
finishes  his  task, — a  psychology  without  a  soul. 

Likens,  hrwever,  he  discards  a  mind  aggregated  from 
mental  functions.  "The  I  which  knows  them  cannot  itself  be 
an  aggregate"  (Page  400).  If  sensations  knew  themselves 
there  would  be  no  need  of  mind  at  all.  Sensations,  experien- 
ces, etc.,  accredited  with  Wundtian  powers,  could  walk  off  and 
perform  all  the  separate  offices  ascribed  to  personality;  but  "I" 
would  know  nothing  of  it,  would  have  no  say  in  the  panorama. 
On  the  theory  propounded,  personality  as  it  is  revealed  in 
self-consciousness  would  never  have  been  suspected.  Based 
on  an  external  study  of  the  causes  of  phenomena,  the  theory 
pictures  not  man  as  he  knows  himself,  but  as  he  ought  to  de- 
ceive himself  into  thinking  himself  on  its  preconceptions.  In 
fine,  proceeding  on  an  impossible  theory  of  cognition,  it  re- 
sults in  the  destruction  of  personality,  a  sacrifice  for  which 
the  compounded  substitute  is  no  compensation. 

PERSONALITY  AS  REVEALED  BY  VOLITION. 

A  "composite"  personality  we  have  seen  is  incompatible  with 
a  true  theory  of  cognition,  because  mind  is  needed  to  perform 
the  synthesis  whose  summation  is  supposed  to  result  in  mind. 
A  mind  produced  from  matter,  whatever  the  process,  arrives 
too  late.  Its  office  is  performed  before  it  appears.  The  ego  is 
the  active  principle  in  cognition,  not  a  compound  of  cognitions. 
Having  hitherto  considered  only  those  active  powers  of 
the  ego  exercised  in  cognition,  we  might  have  defined  man,  as 
did  Spinoza,  **certus  et  determinattta  modus  cognitandi\*^  but 
man  is  more  than  a  knowing  principle,  he  is  also  volitional 
and  emotional.  What  therefore  do  we  mean  or  should  we 
mean  by  volition?  Am  I  a  free  agent,  or  the  helf  less  child  of 
necessity?  Do  I  exercise  will,  or  are  my  volitions  made  for 
me?    Can  I  assert  the  freedom  of  my  nature  by  resistance  to 


Finite  Peraonality. 


IS 


forces  infinitely  greater  than  those  I  command,  or  does  the 
same  necessity  which  obtains  without  me  in  nature  control  all 
psychic  phenomena? 

Two  answers  are  given  to  these  questions.  One  says,  man 
possesses  a  native  power  of  self-determination  which  lays  him 
open  to  responsibility,  exposes  him  to  the  reproof  of  conscience, 
and  at  the  same  time  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  world's  busi- 
ness, social  and  religious  economy.  The  other  finds  personali- 
ty the  product  of  complex  forces  whose  play  is  independent  of 
its  wish  or  will ;  it  is  not  self-determined ,  it  is  determined  ex 
mente. 

It  follows  also  that,  if  will  be  a  product  of  natural  forces, 
it  will  have  a  "natural  history."    This  introduces  a  theory  of 
the  genesis  of  man's  volitional  powers  in  which  empiricism 
takes  especial  pride.    Professor  Bain's  account  may  be  accept- 
ed as  typical.    In  brief,  he  teaches  that  mental  phenomena  co- 
ordinate with  external  stimuli.    Refiex  action  affords  us  the 
fundamental  type  of  response :  spontaneous  movements  cause 
either  pleasure,  and  are  repeated,  or  pain,  and  are  avoided ; 
thus  driyen  by  pain,  and  allured  by  pleasure,  our  habits  be- 
come  fixed   and  such   will  as  we  possess  is  evolved.    Let  us 
quote  Bain:^  "What  we  have  to  explain  is  the  educational 
process  of  connecting  definite  feelings  with  definite  actions, 
so  that,  in  the  furtherance  of  our  ends,  the  one  shall  command 
the  other    .    .    the  pleasure  results  from  the  movements  and 
responds,  by  sustaining  and  increasing  it.    The  delight  thus 
feeds  itself."     Now  this  last  short  sentence  is  not  intended  to 
be  poetical.    Personification  of  feeling  is  quite  in  line  with  a 
theory  which  soberly  assures  us  that  personality  is  but  a  sum  of 
this  and  other  experiences.    Singularly  enough,  though,  some- 
thing more  than  the  feelings  is  assumed,  for  an  ^^educational 
process  of  connecting  definite  feelings  with  definite  actions" 
for  "the  furtherance  of  our  ends"  implies  the  presence  of  a 
type  of  personality  quite  incompatible  with  the  theory.    /, 
who  distinguish  pleasure  from  pain,  am  capable  both  of  "edu- 
cation" and  of  "furthering  endi<,"  but  /  am  conscious  that  I 
am  more  than  my  feelings.    To  represent  will  as  equivalent  to 
a  play  of  motives  analogous  to  the  meeting  of  complex  forces 


'Emotions  and  Will.  p.  321. 


24 


Finite  Peraonaltty, 


in  the  physical  world,  where  the  oatcome  is  determined  by  the 
"last  appetite"  or  "strongest  motive,"  makes  consciousness 
but  the  theatre  of  contending  forces,  of  whose  play  I  am  a 
passive  spectator.  I  may  be  the  child  of  fortune  ol^the  victim 
of  disaster;  I  may  discover  myself  a  saint  or  a  villain;  but 
natural  laws  wholly  and  of  themselves  have  determined  the 
result 

A  statement  so  crass  might  be  resented  by  advocates  of  a 
theory  essentially  identical;  while  others  glory  in  the  dis- 
covery that  "remorse"  should  have  no  place  in  human  exper- 
ience, and  that  duty  is  conventional.  Fatalism  is  welcomed 
because  it  relieves  man  of  responsibility;  not,  of  course,  from 
responsibility  to  the  state,  because  our  fellow- men  still  exact 
it  of  us;  but  it  is  supposed  to  relieve  us  from  another  kind  of 
responsibility. 

Much  of  the  coufusion  which  clouds  the  discussion  of 
volition  may  be  avoided  by  drawing  a  sharp  distinction  be- 
tween two  radically  different  things,  namely,  will  and  power. 
Will  is  choice,  preference,  purpose,  i.  e.,  seff -direction  towards 
an  end.  Power  represents  the  quantity  of  force  under  my 
control.  This  may  be  ni7,  or  sufllcient  to  conquer  the  world. 
In  so  far  as  I  am  endowed  with  power  my  will  is  oauaal^  but 
the  effect  depends  on  two  factors  (will  and  power)  only  one  of 
which  is  free;  the  other  is  often  overmatched.  When  Tappan 
Bays  "he  willa  to  walk  and  his  legs  obey,"  he  tells  us  a  good 
deal  more  than  that  man  willed:  he  tells  us  also  something 
about  his  strength.  A  paralytic  may  will  to  walk  and  yet 
remain  motionless.  His  will  is  normal,  but  his  strength  has 
failed.  EanVs  definition  of  will  as  "a  kind  of  causality  be- 
longing to  living  agents  in  so  far  as  they  are  rational"  is 
olijeotionable  because  it  lends  itself  to  a  similar  confusion.^ 

The  expression,  "freedom  of  will"  is  likewise  misleading, 
because  tautological.  If  man  has  will  power,  he  is  free. 
When  Locke  says  that  the  man  under  whom  a  bridge  breaks 
is  not  free,  he  confuses  freedom  with  liberty.  Certainly  the 
man  does  not  will  to  fall  into  the  river;  he  wills  just  the 
opposite.  As  far  an  willing  is  concerned  he  is  a  free  agent, 
and  if  possessed  of  power  equal  to  his  will  he  would  not  suffer 


^^letaphysics  of  Ethics,  Ohap.  III. 


Finite  Peraonality, 


16 


immerBion.    A  prisoner  is  deprived  of  his  liberty,  but  he  wills 
otherwise,  and  this  attests   at  once  bis  self>determination  and 
his  restraint.    An  act  of  will  being  an  act  of  choice,  if  I  have 
the  power  of  choice,  freedom  is  conceded.    If  my  volition  were 
the  result  of  external  or  internal  forces  independently  of  my 
wish  or  control,  then  I  should  be  the  creature  of  necessity. 
But  I  find  myself  endowed  with  the  power  of  balancing  motives 
and,  refraining  from  action  till   I  am  decided  as  to  what 
course  is  best  to  pursue,  then  I  make  the  decision  and  am 
conscious  of  my  freedom  in  so  doing;  and  though  a  million 
actions  be  performed  indifferently,  if  I   draw  the  rein  and 
determine  one  only,  that  single  act  proves  possession  of  self- 
directive  power.    To  speak  of  a  "free  will*'  as  though  it  were 
a  foreign  power  acting  independently  is  to  misrepresent  the 
case.    Mr.  Fiske  is  guilty  of  a  caricature  of  this  kind  when 
he  represents  such  a  lawless  will,  in  its  caprice,  pitching  an 
unsuspecting  man  out  of  a  fourth  story  window.^    Certainly 
volitions  are  "caused."    I  cause  my  volitions,  otherwise  I 
should  not  be  free.    Accordingly  ^'free-will"  is  a  term  to  be 
laid  aside  in  favor  of  self-determination,  self-action,  freedom 
of  the  agent,  etc.,  because  these  are  more  accurately  expressive 
of  the  case.    /  am  the  actor,  and  I  know  I  am.    It  is  mislead- 
ing even  to  say  I  ought  to  govern  my  will^  for  correctly  speak- 
ing I  should  say  govern  myself. 

The  action  of  conscience  thus  becomes  intelligible.  It 
does  not  lash  my  will,  or  my  passion,  or  my  motive ;  it  con- 
demns me.  /  should  have  acted  otherwise;  /  ought  to  have 
practiced  self-control,  etc.  The  state  and  society,  following 
the  same  principle,  hold  me  responsible,  as  though  I  were  the 
the  chief  arbiter  of  my  own  deeds;  and  they  are  right. 

It  is  useless  for  Spinoza,  Hume  and  others  to  assure  me 
that  self-reproach  is  a  mistake.  I  know  I  might  have  done  dif- 
ferently; that  is  what  gives  regret  its  canker.  Remorse  does 
not  kindle  its  fires  over  every  unfortunate  action  of  mine;  only 
when  /  might  have  have  done  right  and  did  not,  that's  when  I 
suffer. 

By  personal  freedom  therefore  I  mekn  that  I  can  deter- 
determine  my  own  attitude  to  environing  forces,  that  and 


'Cosmic  Philosophy,  Part  II.  Chap.  XYII. 


16 


Finite  Personality. 


I 

i 


nothing  more;  not  that  I  can  change  or  oyeroome  them.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  I  am  organic  to  nature,  inexplicably,  no  doubt, 
yet  in  such  a  way  that  I  can,  nnder  normal  conditions,  impress 
my  will  upon  my  environment,  and  actually  do  modify,  and  not 
frequently  quell,  forces  which  antagonize  my  purpose;  but 
whether  success  or  failure  attends  my  endeavor  is  a  matter  of 
power,  not  alone  of  will.  My  strength  is  limited,  but  I  am 
free. 

If  "freedom"  implied  that  men  were  free  from  restraint, 
then  only  one  person  in  the  world  could  be  free,  and  in  order 
to  freedom  he  would  require  sufficient  force  to  control  the 
Universe.  As  it  is,  however,  man  is  as  free  by  nature,  as  if  be 
were  omnipotent;  he  is  self- determinative — the  only  thiog  he 
is  held  responsible  for  by  Omuiscience — and  if  carried  down  a 
stream  he  cannot  stem,  he  can  nevertheless  show  his  will  by 
trying  to  "head  upwards." 

It  is  no  objection  to  my  freedom  to  say  that  action  fol- 
lows the  line  of  character.  IndeeJ,  I  should  not  be  free  if  I 
could  not  follow  my  bent.  The  miser  naturally  hoards,  and 
the  spendthrift  squanders  his  money;  but  it  is  not  a  neces- 
sity laid  upon  them.  Each  can  oppose  his  tendency ;  c^n  will 
not  to  yield  to  his  passion,  and,  if  strong  enough,  he  can  con* 
qner  his  weakness.  In  otLer  words,  "character"  is  but  the 
term  for  man's  habitual  conduct,  the  product  of  numberless 
acts.  Every  volition  helps  to  modify  the  brand.  It  is  im- 
proved or  deteriorated  by  each  day's  doing.  It  is  never  abso- 
lutely fixed,  but  is  ever  fluent.  I  am  the  architect  of  my 
character  simply  and  solely  because  I  am  a  free  agent. 

Is  heredity,  then,  denied?  By  no  means.  For  my 
original  disposition,  be  it  sunny  or  tempestuous,  I  am  no  more 
responsible  than  for  the  color  of  my  eyes,  the  date  of  my 
birth  or  the  weight  of  the  sun;  but  I  am  responsible  for  modi- 
fying my  disposition  by  that  self-control  which  moulds  char 
acter.  Moral  worth  attaches  only  and  wholly  to  the  self-ac- 
tion of  the  agent.  If  he  wills  the  right  and  is  prevented  from 
executing  his  purpose,  we  adjudge  him  guiltless.  Bodily  re- 
straint does  not  mar  his  worth. 

m 

If  it  could  be  shown  that  the  evolution  of  the  race,  the 
heredity  of  the  individual,  the  cerebral  processes  due  to  en- 
yironing  stimnli,  produce  man's  conduct  without  his  let  or 


Finite  PerMonality. 


17 


hindrance,  then  "perBonality"  would  remain  but  the  name  for  a 
more  or  loss  consoious  automaton,  who,  in  so  far  as  he  con- 
ceives himself  free,  is  the  victim  of  "chronic  delusion."  He 
deserves  neither  praise  nor  blame.  Indeed  he  is  counted  out 
by  the  theory ;  external  forces  have  taken  their  remorseless 
way ;  nothing  could  have  been  otherwise.  There  no  longer  re 
mains  a  distinction  between  what  is  and  what  ought  to  be. 
This  however  is  simply  the  denial  of  will.  Choice  is  excluded. 
Man  is  brought  to  the  level  of  the  machine. 

Briefly  to  recapitulate:  one  theory  begins  with  an  unper- 
sonal  postulate,  follows  a  mechanical  method,  and  presents 
us  an  indirect  conclusion — a  conclusion,  moreover,  inconsis- 
tent with  the  fabric  of  society,  discredited  by  the  pronounce- 
ments of  conscience,  and  contradicted  by  the  only  witness  in  a 
position  to  speak  with  direct^^authority,  viz.,  self  conscious- 
ness The  other  therry  begins  in  consciousness,  the  only 
place  where  will  is  known,  finds  it  an  original  power  of  per 
sonality,  thoroughly  consistent  with  conscience,  and  the  sense 
of  responsibility;  makes  no  apology  for  the  one,  nor  finds  it 
necessary  to  explain  away  the  other.  Moreover,  in  the  light 
of  this  finding  it  becomes  intelligible  why  the  whole  structure 
of  society  is  based  on  contract;  how  men  plan  and  promise  and 
perform;  how  in  fine  man,  taking  raw  nature,  can  re-create  it; 
ye^  and  from  the  crude  stuff  of  his  original  nature,  he  con- 
structs a  character. 

PERSONALITY  AS  REVEALED  BY  EMOTION  AND  ISOLATION. 

Thought  and  volition  are  accompanied  by  feeling,  which, 
as  distinguished  from  sensation,  is  called  emotion,  and  the 
distinction  is  radical.  One  causes  thought;  the  other  is  pro- 
duced by  thought.  Emotion  rises  in  the  mind  and  diffuses 
itself  outwards  over  the  whole  system.  Sensation  has  an  ex- 
ternal cause,  a  definite  organ,  and  travels,  so  to  speak,  inwards. 
While  it  is  universally  recofl;nized  that  all  emotion  is  subjec- 
tive and  can  exist  no  otherwise,  it  is  not  seen  that  sensations 
are  equally  personal.  Of  course  my  emotions  of  love,  pride, 
reverence,  etc.,  have  existence  only  in  my  mind,  even  when,  as 
usual,  they  haye  objective  reference.  But  because  sensations 
have  an  objective  cause,  it  is  often  assumed  that  they  have 
also  an  objective  existence;    accordingly,  much  philosophy 


li^^i 


I 


is 


Finite  Penonality. 


and  soionco  are  written  as  though  the  universe  would  be  Just 
as  we  know  it,  though  all  minds  were  annihilated,  all  person- 
ality extinct.  Yet  sound,  color,  light,  love,  hate,  pity  have  no 
existence  except  in  mind;  their  being  is  personal.  Tremulous 
ether  is  not  light,  but  only  its  mechanical  cause.  The  ether(  ?) 
has  objective  being.  Light  is  subjective,  has  its  being  in  the 
mind.  Vibrant  air  becomes  sound  only  to  a  properly  equipped 
intelligence.  Music  literally  has  its  home  in  the  soul.  It  is 
the  ego  who  translates  mechanical  movement  into  melody. 

Now  only  the  formal  elements  of  knowledge  are  capable 
of  precise  comparison,  as  exemplified  in  mathematics,  geometry, 
etc.,  but  all  subjective  experience  is  from  exact  comparison 
excluded.  Strawberry  has  not  the  same  flavor  to  Mr.  S.  and 
Miss  E.,  for  although  favorite  to  the  former,  is  distasteful 
(and  poisonous)  to  the  latter.  So  far  as  name  is  concerned, 
red  is  the  rame  color  to  two  individuals,  but  again  produces 
different  subjective  efl'ects.  So  also  of  sounds,  odors,  etc.  In 
a  word,  sensations,  volitions  and  emotions  do  not  exist  in  the 
air,  or  in  vacuo ;  they  centre  in  a  subject.  Their  esse  is  per- 
sonal. Personality  may  therefore  be  characterized  as  a  sub- 
jective universe,  a  conscious  centre  of  life,  a  cosmos  of  exper- 
ience, and  may  be  shown  to  possess  elements  which  make  each 
sui  generis  in  the  world. 

Such  being  the  case,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  indicate 
more  particulaaly  man's  threefold  relationship  to  his  environ- 
ment, to  God,  nature  and  his  fellowmen.  Not  self  created,  he 
has  his  being  in  the  Supreme,  with  whom  his  relation  may  be 
characterized  as  accordant  or  resentful.  Again  he  is  articulate 
with  nature  through  his  physical  organism,  by  means  of 
which  the  external  world  impresses  itself  upon  him,  and  he 
conversely  impresses  himself  upon  it.  It  is,  however,  man's 
relation  to  man,  as  personal  which  most  requires  attention 
because  affording  a  clue  to  both  the  other  relations. 

First,  then,  as  to  fixed  distance  between,  individuals;  I 
find  myself  an  isolated  unity,  permitted  to  approach  within 
signalling  distance  of  other  persons,  yet  forever  separated 
from  them  by  an  impassable  gulf.  No  individual,  however 
intimate  with  his  alter  ego,  can  cross  over  into  his  sanctum 
sanctissimum.  It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  stand  within 
your  experience  as  within  my  own  and  see  the  universe  you 


Jf'inite  Pertonality, 


19 


know.  And,  vice  versa,  you  are  pro-ompted  from  standing  at 
the  heart  of  mine.  The  **without"  is  in  part  common;  the 
within  is  sui  generis.  As  many  spiritual  universes  exist  as 
there  are  individual  persons.  My  own  experience  is  first  hand, 
known  from  within;  that  of  others,  second  hand,  known  from 
without  by  means  of  interpreted  signs — language,  gesture  and 
grimace.  All  experience  takes  place  in  the  first  person. 
Knowledge  never  passes  from  one  to  another.  It  most  be 
born  where  it  lives.  It  is  the  construction  of  my  own  mental 
powers,  exercised  upon  either  the  same  facts  you  have  inter- 
preted, or  upon  those  conventional  human  symbols  whose 
intelligibility  depends  equally  upon  my  own  powers  of  inter- 
pretation. 

My  universe,  that  is  the  universe  of  which  I  am  the  cen- 
tre and  life — my  pain,  pleasure,  fear,  care,  anxiety,  hope;  my 
ambition  and  my  love;  my  sub-conscious  and  even  my  uncon- 
scious qualities, — constitute  a  whole  world  of  realities  which 
exist  not,  and  cannot  exist  any  other  where;  but  which,  al- 
though confessedly  subjective  in  being,  yet  nevertheless, 
through  me,  modify  the  world  and  change  the  course  of  his- 
tory. Everybody  recognizes  that  the  '^personal  factor"  is  pre- 
dominent  in  history.  The  rise  and  fall  of  empires ;  the  birth 
and  propagation  of  religions;  the  development  of  literature, 
science,  commerce,  etc.,  are  personal  achievements.  A  type 
of  temperament  precipitated  the  French  Revolution;  a  similar 
peculiarity  cost  Charles  I.  his  head;  "Ambition"  may  be  said 
to  have  established  the  Empire;  ''Bighteonsness"  to  have  gov- 
erned the  Commonwealth.  The  trend  of  history  notoriously 
follows  the  bent  of  persons;  whether  selfish,  as  seen  in  the  vic- 
tories of  Alexander,  Zenghis  Kahn  and  Napoleon ;  or  altruistic, 
as  manifested  by  the  labors  of  Moses,  Solon,  Lycurgas,  or  the 
poets  and  the  scientists,  the  philosophers  and  reformers  of  the 
world. 

Having  now  emphasized  the  isolation  and  peculiarity  of 
each  human  personality,  it  may  be  asked,  *'I8  there  no  nearer 
means  of  communication  between  persons?"  We  think  there 
is.  The  phenomena  of  hypnotism,  telepathy  and  that  sensi- 
tiveness to  personal  presence,  too  subtle  for  expression,  and 
variously  described  as  ''animal  magnetism,"  "personal  atmos- 
phere" or  personal  charm,  require  explanation,  and  afford  at 


90 


Finite  Personality, 


least  preinmptive  evidence  in  favor  of  inter  related  ■I'hcrei  of 
inflaence. 

If  the  ego  were  a  logical  point  or  the  "original  aynthetio 
unity  of  apperception,"  to  use  Kant'a  ezpreesion,  it  could  have 
no  complexion  or  character.  Bat,  if  we  trust  self-conscious- 
ness, "a  point"  does  nut  represent  me.  Kant's  method  of  seg- 
regation  led  to  not  a  few  misrepresentations  of  personality. 

There  is  but  one  ego,  not  three,  and  not  three  fractions  of 
an  ego.  Organic  to  nature  it  is,  and  "transcendent"  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  superior  to  all  that  is  below  it  in  the  spiritual 
scale;  indescribable,  truly,  in  terms  of  sense,  but  hot  for  that 
reason  ''unlcnowable,"  or  to  be  offered  on  the  altar  of  a  geom- 
etrical "point."  Moreover  it  lends  itself  to  confusion  to  speak 
of  an  "empirical"  ego,  as  though  there  could  be  such  a  thing. 
One  ego  there  is,  a  spiritual  unity  and  capable  of  experience 
because  inter-related  with  the  universe.  It  is  only  man's  in- 
eradicable habit  of  representing  all  things  in  spacial  relations 
which  prevents  us  from  seeing  that  there  may  be  many  spirit- 
ual universes  which  do  not  exclude  each  other  as  material  ob- 
jects do;  but  to  a  limited  extent,  at  least,  are  interpenetrative. 
The  difflcnlty  we  have  to  compass  largely  appertains  to 
language.  We  talk  in  "picture  terms,"  drawn  from  things 
visible;  the  spiritual  remaining  for  that  cause  beyond  the  grip 
of  speech,  even  when  thought  is  not  *'lost."  Accordingly  it  is 
easy  to  see  why  personality  is  bettor  described  as  an  energy 
than  as  a  substance.  Nor  is  it  all  guess  work  when  we  speak 
of  interpenetrative  spheres.  Subjective  experience  affords  il- 
lustration; thought,  feeling  and  volition,  separable  as  ab- 
stractions,  are  not  related  in  externality  like  books  upon  a 
shelf.  Each  is  different  from  the  other,  yet  each  is  permeated 
by  the  other.  No  less  fruitful  of  illustration  is  the  objective 
world.  Light,  heat  and  chemical  powers  reside  in  the  same 
beam,  a  trinity  in  unity.  May  it  not,  indeed,  be  said,  that 
the  universe  is  constituted  of  interpenetrating  realities?  The 
"impenetrability  of  matter"  escapes  being  a  misnomer  only 
because  some  forms  of  matter  are  mutually  exclusive. 

Reality  we  have  shown  is  ultimately  spiritnaP  best  de- 
scribed as  force  or  energy,  and  science  demonstrates  the  uni- 


*Vide.  Section  I. 


Finite  Peraonahty, 


91 


verse  to  be  a  unity  of  inter-aotiye  forces.  It  is  only  because 
science  begins  with  tlie  lowest  category  of  being,  instead  of 
with  the  highest,  that  for  it,  the  "reign  of  law"  fixes  the  limit 
of  the  real ;  but  personality  remains  inexplicable  on  a  basis  so 
low;  while  the  whole  universe  becomes  intelligible  on  assump- 
tion of  the  higher. 

Gravitation,  cohesion,  electricity,  magnetism  and  chemi- 
cal affinity,  being  unconscious,  afford  us  analogy  only  in  the 
undeniable  fact  of  their  interpenetration ;  but  in  self-con* 
sciousness  man  feels  the  change  within,  not  less  than  his  alter- 
ing environment;  and  further  realizes  that  the  latter  to  some 
extent  results  from  the  former  according  to  personal  prefer- 
ence. Because  hand  and  eye,  foot  and  finger,  are  under  direct 
control  of  volition,  they  are  not  therefore  relieved  from  the 
sway  of  non- personal  forces — gravitation,  chemism,  heat,  mag- 
netism etc.;  but  because  my  organism  is  inter-related  with  na- 
ture and  self-directive,  I  can  (to  a  limited  extent)  bend  these 
forces  to  my  will,  or  accommodate  myself  to  their  power,  e.  g., 
by  posture,  diet,  change  of  climate,  etc.  A  chemical  element 
which  travels  from  the  inorganic  through  the  vegetable,  up  to 
the  animal  kingdom  becomes  amenable  to  different  and  higher 
laws  without  escaping  any  of  those  under  which  it  originally 
existed.  Gravitation  follows  it  alike  in  the  furnace,  the  cru- 
cible and  in  vital  functions.  Varicose  veins  are  I'ound  below, 
not  above  the  heart.  In  brief,  the  forces  named  represent 
kingdoms  which  interpenetrate  freely,  yet  by  indisputable 
right  exercise  their  respective  sovereignties. 

Now  personality  is  a  universe  having  a  conscious  nucleus. 
All  in  it  is  related  to  its  centre.  Its  direction  and  deternaina* 
tion,  in  so  far  as  will  is  supplemented  with  power,  are  con- 
trolled from  that  same  point.  Furthermore,  if  we  may  follow 
the  analogies  above  described,  and  learn  that  personal  spheres 
interpenetrate  to  a  limited  extent,  we  find  an  explanation  of 
many  subtle  personal  influences  otherwise  unaccounted  for. 
Tnat  indefinable  something  named  "personal  charm"  which 
veiled  the  unattractive  features  of  Socrates  and  George  Eliot, 
smothered  the  defects  of  Abelard  and  Aaroa  Burr,  graced  the 
gifts  of  Chesterfield,  covered  the  "filth"  of  Samuel  Johnson, 
and  today  makes  A.  J.  Balfour  as  conspicuous  a  favorite  on  one 
side  of  the  Atlantic  as  is  Professor  James  on  the  other,  is  not 


r 


i  i 


SB 


Finite  Personality, 


"causeless"  because  it  eludes  definition.  It  represents  one  of 
the  most  potent  forces  in  the  world.  Furthermore,  it  would 
seem  that  personal  charm  is  given  by  measure  unto  man,  for 
who  has  not  regretted  his  own  ualoveliness?  Who  has  not 
marvelled  at  indescribable  antipathies  which  fence  him  from 
his  fellowman  ? 

Yet  personality  is  not  a  fixed  quantity.  It  is  capable  of 
development.  This  leads  to  a  third  peculiarity  of  personal 
relationship,  namely,  that  "distance"  or  "nearness,"  within 
limitations  already  indicated,  is  a  matter  under  the  control  of 
volition.  Professor  Seth  has  well  said  that  ''each  self  is  an 
unique  existence,  which  is  perfectly  imperviousy  if  I  may  so 
speak,  to  other  selves — impervioiu  in  a  fashion  of  which  the 
impenetrability  of  matter  is  a  faint  analogue."^ 

For  no  repulsions  are  observable  in  nature  so  startling  as 
those  irremediable  antagonisms,  personal  and  national,  whose 
succession  has  woven  a  deep  red  line  into  the  web  of  history. 
But  personal  forces  are  amenable  to  personal  control,  and  so 
it  is  found  I  can  ^'freeze'*  a  fellow  mortal  out  of  my  friendship) 
or  fasten  him  to  my  soul  "with  hoops  of  steel."  I  can  "shrink 
smaller  than  a  knot-hole;"  I  can  "blaze"  or  "burn"  or  "hard* 
en;"  I  can  "flow"  or  "thrill"  and  produce  like  effects  upon 
others;  and  all  this,  not  by  expressed  anger,  on  the  one  hand, 
or  the  grace  of  "diplomatic"  approach  on  the  other;  but,  while 
the  placid  surface  of  politeness  remains  undisturbed  through* 
out,  by  a  sort  of  extension  or  withdrawal  of  inexpressible  sym- 
pathy. How  often  we  feel  that  an  element  entirely  incongru- 
ous with  the  professions  of  friendship  keeps  persons  apart! 
This  field  is  too  well  known  and  its  subject  matter  too  volum- 
inous to  require  further  reference.  What  we  mean  is  well  un< 
dcrstood. 

Now  this  trinity  of  peculiarities  discoverable  in  personal 
relationships,  may  aid  us  in  a  matter  of  supreme  importance : 
What  is  our  relation  to  Deity? 

MAN'S  RELATION  TO  GOD. 

First,  man  cannot  be  isolated  from  God,  the  source  of  his 
life,  as  perjorce  he  is  from  his  fellow-man  who  holds  with  him, 


'Heselianism  and  Personality,  p.  227. 


Finite  Personality. 


23 


in  common,  of  the  Divine  nature.  My  being  as  part  of  His  is 
one,  at  the  centre,  with  its  source  and,  so  to  speak,  is  rooted  in 
and  supported  by  it.  Moreover,  it  could  not  be  separated 
from  Him  literally  without  being  taken  out  of  the  universe : 
accordingly,  so  far  from  being  irretrievably  isolated  from  God,  I 
am  inseparably  linked  to  Him. 

Further,  all  that  has  been  adduced  regardin(;  interaction 
of  personal  influence  receives  emphasis  when  viewed  in  regard 
to  man's  relation  to  Deity.  In  nature  I  am  sensitive  to  alter- 
ing temperatures  and  atmospheric  change;  I  am  exposed  to 
the  waves  of  depression  or  enthusiasm,  which  sweep  the  social 
sea;  I  feel  the  infection  and  share  the  contagion  of  national 
foibles  and  fervors.  Is  it  not  therefore  legitimate  to  infer 
that  I  am,  or  ought  to  be,  more  sensitive  to  spiritual  influence 
at  its  Source,  than  to  its  play  among  individuals  who  merely 
share  in  it  as  I  do?  The  inference  seems  conclusive.  If  we 
"live  and  move  and  have  our  being"  in  Deity,  we  may  adopt 
Tennyson's  phraseology,  "Spirit  with  spirit  can  meet ;  closer 
is  He  than  breathing,  and  nearer  than  hands  and  feet."  Of 
course  "sensitiveness"  depends  on  cultivation ;  insensibility  on 
neglect;  a  law  as  potent  in  spiritual  as  in  physical  life. 

Further,  if  analogy  carried,  my  relation  to  The  Supreme 
is  adjustable  at  will.  Envy,  aversion,  hate,  as  personal  repul- 
sions, represent  "distance"  between  individuals;  while  friend- 
ship, sympathy  and  love  indicate  that  communion  of  soul 
which  knits  relations  of  araity — a  literal  oneness  of  feeling, 
not  to  the  loss  of  individuality,  but  to  its  conscious  emphasis. 
So  also  in  my  nearer  relationships  to  God,  whose  nature  I  share, 
personality  is  not  sacrificed ;  it  is  emphasized  by  man's  self- 
consciousness  and  self  determination.  "Distance"  and  "alti- 
tude," even  to  Deity,  is  a  voluntary  adjustment.  The  inter- 
penetration  of  personal  spheres,  their  sensitive  poise  and 
feeling,  do  not  preclude  that  "self  action"  which  is  a  character- 
istic feature  of  personality. 

I  have  not  met  any  one  who  professed  to  have  mastered 
Hegel's  philosophy.  When  Stirling  and  Martineau  are  not 
ashamed  to  confess  arrearage  in  this  regard,  we  need  not  pause 
to  settle  Hegel's  precise  view  of  "personality"  or  to  take  sides 
on  the  "Neo-Hegelian"  dispute  between  Seth  and  Fairbrother; 
but  it  is  vastly  important  to  indicate  that  an  unconscious  or 


84 


Finite  Personality. 


II  < 


fractional  personality  is  no  personality  at  all.  The  Kantian 
or  Hegelian  idea  of  God  as  pare  thought  is  a  conception  which 
satisfies  no  religious  or  moral  need  of  the  human  soul.  Color 
or  warmth  it  has  none,  and  there  is  no  "loveliness"  that  wo 
should  desire  it.  At  best  it  is  the  "apotheosis  of  an  abstrac* 
tion "  for  **pure  thought"  is  a  pure  abstraction.  Such  a 
theory  makes  God  "thought"  but  not  a  thinker.  Impersooal 
and  unconscious,  he  "finds  himself"  or  "comes  ta  conscious- 
ness" only  in  the  consciousness  of  human  individuals.  Un- 
satisfactory as  such  a  presentation  of  Deity  must  ever  remain 
to  the  man  who  is  reaching  out  to  The  Mighty  for  either 
friendship  or  help,  there  is  the  further  objection  that  it  is 
absolutely  unphilosophical,  because  it  represents  God  as  a 
"developing  deity."  His  subjective  life  depending  on  the 
objective  progress  of  the  material  universe,  he  cannot  arrive 
at  consciousness  until  evolution  has  brought  forth  creatures 
ranged  hierarchially  with  man  at  the  summit;  and  in  man 
first  discovers  himself  to  himself,  man  being  the  "realization" 
of  the  absolute.  Such  a  deity  would  require  another  deity 
to  control  the  "development" ;  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the 
theory. 

There  are  many  doubtless  who  refuse  the  extreme  Hegelian 
thesis  of  "pure  thought"  as  the  prius  of  all  that  is,  who 
nevertheless  are  satisfied  with  a  conception  of  deity  as  merely 
a  "thinkmgpersonality" ;  but  how  much  better  is  this? 
None,  except^t  gains  the  benefit  of  implied  qualities.  In  all 
the  persons  we  know,  will  and  feeling  attend  thought;  and  we 
may  unconsciously  complete  the  figure  and  rest  content  with 
our  improvement  on  the  actual  doctrine.  Such  a  process 
however  reveals  the  defect  of  the  theory.  A  will-less,  unfeeling 
deity  might  elicit  wonder,  not  worship;  admiration,  not  ador- 
ation. 

God  cannot  be  less  than  man  at  best,  and  He  must  be 
more.  Human  personality  cannot  be  explained  from  a  person- 
ality inferior  to  itself.  The  first  need  of  science  is  for  a  first 
cause  adequate  to  account  for  what  is.  More,  morality 
transcends  the  demands  of  mere  science  and  seeks  for  a  deity 
worthy  of  accounting  for  what  ought  to  &e,  and  because  so 
worthy  calls  for  inexpressible  adoration  and  love.  Person- 
ality is  more  than  "idea"  or  "thought,"  in  that  it  is  permanent 


V    ! 


Unite  Personality. 


95 


amidst  change,  suffers  and  reacts,  and  is  characterized  by 
volition  as  well  as  intelligence.  "Self-existence*'  and  "existence 
for  self  differentiate  widely  enough  to  indicate  the  distinction 
between  infinite  and  finite  personality.  In  God  both  are 
realized,  makins;  reality  theo-centric;  in  man  the  latter  alone, 
making  knowledge,  volition  and  emotion  ego-centric.  Human 
personality  is  incomplete  as  "lent  out"  from  the  Divine,  in 
whom  alone  is  personality  perfect. 

Nevertheless  personality  proper  may  be  ascribed  to  man. 
His  identity  is  not  lost  in  Deity  nor  his  self-direction  forfeited. 
The  "wave"  and  "drop'*  figure  is  helpful  in  this  relation 
only  as  indicating  community  of  nature,  but  beyond  that  in- 
adequate as  being  wholly  mechanical.  The  predicates  of 
personality,  consciousness,  volition,  etc.,  are  entirely  wanting; 
whereas  man  can  resist  and  resent  as  well  as  love  and  adore 
Deity.  The  clearest  deliverance  I  am  acquainted  with  on  the 
relationship  we  are  discussing  is  by  the  pen  of  Dr.  James 
Martineau  (in  a  letter  to  the  author,  dated  January  25,  1896). 
He  is  criticising  the  "spark"  illustration : 

"But  this  relation  of  scale  between  similars  is  not  the 
relation  of  opposites^  between  perceiving  subject  and  perceived 
object.  I,  as  percipient,  know  my  book,  my  lamp,  my  com- 
panion, as  different  from  me,  and  over  against  me,  as  belonging 
to  the  not-me.  The  spark  does  not  know  another  spark,  or 
the  fire,  as  something  either  same  or  other.  This  duality  and 
antithesis  of  mental  apprehension  receives  no  illustration  from 
big  and  little  lights.  The  resort  to  such  imagery  flings  us  at 
once  into  a  pantheism  in  which  personality,  human  and  Divine, 
is  inevitably  lost,  and  the  possibility  of  the  moral  affections 
disappears.  For  the  existence  of  these,  self-conscious  free- 
agents  are  indispensable;  and  persons  are  inconceivable  and 
impossible  as  parts  or  functions  of  another  person.  I  conceive 
therefore  that  the  primary  postulate  of  all  moral  and  religious 
life  is  the  co- presence  of  personal  agents,  human  and  Divine, 
with  separate  spheres  provided  by  the  latter,  of  self  determined 
choice  between  alternatives  of  graduated  worth.  No  doubt 
this  implies  a  certain  abstinence  of  God  from  the  exercise  of 
His  infinitude  of  power,  for  the  sake  of  leaving  8cope  for  the 
play  of  moral  character  and  responsibility  in  a  world  to  which 


98 


Finite  Personality. 


iM 


He  lends  out  on  trust  to  beings  endowed  with  option,  a  portion 
of  the  energy  which  else  is  His." 

And  now  briefly,  in  conclusion,  we  have  shown : 

(1)  That  man's  nature  and  his  relation  to  the  universe 
he  explores  makes  personality  the  beginning  and  goal  of 
philosophy; 

(2)  Determines  its  method; 

(3)  Affords  a  clue  to  the  nature  of  reality,  which  rescues 
philosophy  from  the  shadows  of  a  phenomenology  and  consli< 
tutes  it  an  ontology ;  and  lastly  its  explication  indicates  the 
limits  of  the  Jlxed  and  also  of  the  voluntary  relationships 
man  holds  to  nature,  to  his  fellow-men  and  to  God;  and 
reveals  further  what  these  voluntary  relations  should  be. 
Accordingly,  if  philosophy  is  to  fulfil  her  mission  in  a  rational 
explanation  of  life,  instead  of  denying  tacts  or  accusing  man- 
kind of  racial  insanity,  it  must  investigate  "personality,"  in 
which  lie  buried  the  roots  ot  the  world's  institutions  and 
history;  and  upon  which  alone  a  sound  morality  or  a  true 
religion  can  be  based.  Furthermore,  since  philosophy  like 
science  proceeds  on  hypotheses,  it  ever  presents  to  the  future 
a  prophetic  face;  and  if  one  may  be  permitted  to  read  its 
countenance,  then  the  next  great  stage  in  the  development  of 
philosophy  will  be  the  clearer  definition  of  personality,  and 
the  truer  appreciation  of  its  significance  as  a  key  to  all  human 
mystery  and  aspiration. 

An  aesthetic  ear,  charmed  by  the  felicity  of  his  expression, 
is  apt  to  accept  without  scrutiny  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
exquisite  bon  mot,  "The  highest  reach  of  human  science  is  the 
scientific  recognition  of  human  ignorance,"  yet  the  truth  it  car- 
ries veils  a  deeper;  for  it  drops  man  at  the  limits  of  knowledge, 
shuts  the  door  of  hope  and  extinguishes  faith.  Knowledge  is  an 
investment  for  the  future;  we  cut  the  nerve  of  endeavor  and 
rob  life  of  its  meaning  by  drawing  an  impossible  circle  around 
the  present.  Perhaps  a  nearer  approximation  to  truth  might 
be  attained  by  saying,  the  highest  reach  of  human  science  is 
the  attainment  of  a  scientific  basis  for  human  faith.  At  any 
rate  it  keeps  the  path  open  in  the  direction  in  which  man  is 
moving. 


ii> » 


